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directed to state or local agencies
and private industry that operate in the vicinity of the Bay. We
will lose some of the value of the
study if we are not able to promulgate the results of the study,
and make it available. It may be a
matter of interest that the study
took place, but to make it a matter of profit in the public sense of
profit-people are going to have
to know what the study disclosed,
and they are going to have to be
able to govern themselves in the
light of those findings in the
years to come. So, I think if EPA
is not allowed to carry out its
basic function in this regard, we
will have, in large measure,
wasted the 25 million dollars
that have already been spent. It
is just one example of how the
effort to save money today can
really be more expensive in the
long run if we are not very careful where and how we make the
cuts.
S: Senator, what are the greatest
satisfactions of your office?
M: Well, there were two examples
today. As I was crossing Hopkins
Plaza this afternoon, a woman
who was sitting on a bench jumped
up and said, "Oh I didn't expect
to see you today, but I want to
tell you how wonderful your
office has been in helping the
YWCA in getting their project
completed." I came back to the
office and there was someone
waiting who said, "I just came to
see you and to tell you how
much it has meant to have your
help in getting our projects completed."The ultimate satisfaction
really is to see your help to other
people enable them to do things
that they might not be able to
accomplish without that little bit
of encouragement.

in

People Helping People
The United Way

Interest-Free Loans:

Recent Developments
Provide Tax-Saving Opportunities
by Edward A. Johnston and
David M. Abramson
The 1961 decision of the United
States Tax Court in J. Simpson Dean, 35
T.C. 1083 (1961), set forth in broad
form the general principle that interestfree loans from a corporation to a
shareholder do not give rise to imputed
taxable income. A 'eries of recent
cases involving challenges to this doctrine by the Internal Revenue Service
have been uniformly rejected by the
courts. Thus, a properly structured
interest-free loan provides many opportunities to corporations and individuals for significant income tax savings.
The rationale of Dean is that although
the borrower may have realized an
economic benefit to the extent of the
interest expense which would otherwise have been incurred, any imputed
interest income would be fully offset
by a deductible expense (I.R.C. §163),
leaving the borrower in the same
overall economic and tax position.
An example will serve to illustrate
the income tax advantage of a classic
interest-free loan between a shareholder and his controlled corporation.
Assume that a corporation has
$100,000 extra cash available. If
invested by the corporation, the
interest earned on the $100,000 is
taxable to it, reducing the amount
ultimately available to the shareholder.
Any such interest income distributed
to the shareholder is taxed a second
time as a dividend. If the corporation
instead lent that same $100,000 directly
to the shareholder as an interest-free
demand loan, taxation is avoided at
the corporate level: the corporation
does not have to pay taxes on the
interest generated by the $100,000.
There is no tax consequence to the
corporation as a result of the interestfree loan, and under Dean and its progeny there is no imputed income to
the shareholder.
Substantial gift and estate tax savings can also arise when interest-free
loans are used, rather than the traditional Clifford Trust,' to shift income

from high-to-low-bracket taxpayers.
For example, suppose a daughter in a
high tax bracket has $100,000 to help
her elderly father. The father is in a
low-income bracket and has extensive medical bills. If the daughter puts
that $100,000 into a Clifford Trust,
she has to contend with detailed Clifford Trust statutory requirements,
the $100,000 must remain in the
Trust for over ten years, and the
daughter has gift tax consequences
based on the actuarial value of the
assumed earnings of the Trust and a
resultant use of the unified gift and
estate tax credit.2 All of this can be
avoided if the daughter gives her
father the $100,000 as an interestfree demand loan. There are no statutory requirements for an interestfree loan, the $100,000 is not committed for any length of time, and the
daughter has no gift tax consequences. Income generated by the Clifford
Trust or the interest-free loan is taxable to the father, but this tax is offset
by the father's low-income bracket
and deductions for medical expenses.
In both the interest-free loan and the
Clifford Trust, the principal will be
includable in the estate of the decedent daughter, but in the case of the
loan, no gift is deemed to have been
made, and therefore there is no reduction in the unified tax credit available to the decendent's estate. See:
Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060
(1967), aff'd, 585 F.2d 234 (1978).
Although these examples are set
forth in general terms, and there are
numerous factors affecting both the
potential tax benefits and savings
from interest-free loans, they do serve
to highlight the attractiveness of
interest-free loans. A discussion of
Dean and several other recent cases is
helpful in fully understanding how
interest-free loans should be structured, as well as some of the potential
3
trouble spots.
In Dean, an interest-free loan of an
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Dean may have been an overstatement and that, if the money were
invested in tax-exempt securities, then,
under section 265(2) a different question would be presented. In addition,
the Court rejected the Commissioner's contention that a taxpayer would
not be entitled to an offsetting interest deduction under section 163
because the interest "has not been
actually paid." 72 T.C. at 950.
One week after Greenspun, the Tax
Court was again requested by the
Commissioner to overrule Dean in
Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1009

amount in excess of two million dollars was made to the taxpayer by his
controlled corporation. The Internal
Revenue Service argued that this loan
was similar to the situation in which
the Tax Court had previously imputed
income when the use of corporate
property was made available to a
shareholder without charge. Similarly,
the Service maintained that the use of
corporate funds provided a taxable
"economic benefit derived from the
free use of borrowed funds" and taxable income to the extent of the fair
rental value of corporate property
used by a shareholder. The Court
rejected this contention of the
Commissioner:
In each of... [the cases relied on
by the Service] a benefit was conferred upon the stockholder or
officer in circumstances such that
had the stockholder or officer
undertaken to procure the same
benefit by an expenditure of
money such expenditure would
not have been deductible by him.
Here, on the other hand, had
petitioners borrowed the funds in
question on interest bearing
notes, their payment of interest
would have been fully deductible
by them under section 163, I.R.C.
1954. Not only would they not be
charged with the additional
income in controversy herein, but
they would have a deduction
equal to that very amount. 35
T.C. at 1090.
This "no-income, no-deduction"

approach of the majority of the Tax
Court was criticized in concurring
and dissenting opinions. In these
opinions, the Court observed that
where the shareholder used an interestfree loan in a trade or business an
offsetting deduction would arise. In
situations where the proceeds of the
loan were invested in federally taxexempt obligations, however, no
interest deduction would be permit4
ted under section 265(2) of the Code.
Recently, the Internal Revenue Service has mounted an all-out attack
upon the tax status of interest-free
loans. In the last two years, in no
fewer than seven reported decisions,
the government has attempted to
have the Dean decision overruled or
narrowed. In the case of Greenspun v.

appeal docketed, (5th Cir. 1981). Zager
involved the classic interest-free loan
between a controlled corporation and
its dominant shareholder. Refusing
to overrule Dean, the Court noted
that exceptions to the general rule
may exist, observing:
Thus, if the indebtedness were
incurred by the stockholder or
officer to purchase or carry tax
exempt bonds, a different result
might perhaps be reached in view
of the provision of section 265(2)
of the Code which disallows a
deduction for interest paid in
respect of such indebtedness. Id.
at 1012.

was made by Howard Hughes to a
local newspaper owner and publisher
with the expectation that Hughes
would receive favorable publicity
beneficial to his business interests. In
Greenspun, the Commissioner argued
that because the loan was admittedly
below the prevailing market interest

However, because the issue was not
presented in Zager, the Court declined
to address this question. With regard
to the fundamental argument of the
Service that Dean be overruled, the
Court took the position that the practice of not taxing interest-free loans
was too deeply entrenched in the law
to be judicially displaced and that, if a
change were to be made, the appropriate remedy should be legislative
rather than judicial.
The first deviation from the broad
holding of Dean was applied by the
Tax Court several weeks later in Creel

rate at the time it was made (3%),

v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1173 (1979),

interest income should be imputed to
the borrower to the extent of the
economic benefit to him. In refusing
to accept the Commissioner's invitation to overrule Dean, the Court restated the general principle of Dean that
if interest income were imputed, there
would be an offsetting deduction under
section 163. However, the Court did
recognize that the broad language in

aff'd, No. 80-3135 (5th Cir., filed July
6, 1981). In that case, one of the corporations incurred a substantial increase in its indebtedness just prior to
making these loans to its shareholders.
This increase in the obligations of the
corporation was incurred specifically
for the purpose of making interestfree loans to the shareholders. Although the Court again refused to

Commissioner, 72 T.C. 931 (1979) a loan

XII/I

reconsider its holding in Dean, it did
limit one aspect of the Dean decision,
declaring:
However.. .we think that the
large amounts owed by [the corporation] and guaranteed by petitioners herein during the taxable
years in issue, distinguish that
corporation's loans to petitioners.
...[W]e think the conclusion inescapable that, to the extent that it
had made interest-free loans to
petitioners, [the corporation] was
required to carry interest bearing
obligations to third parties. We
believe and hold, therefore, that
the substance of the transaction
before us was that [the corporation] acted as petitioners' agent in
obtaining loans from its various
creditors to petitioners, and that
it paid interest to these creditors
on behalf of petitioners .... Thus,

we conclude that [the corporation's] payment of that amount of
interest allocable to its interestfree loans to petitioners was
actually a discharge by [the corporation] of petitioner's own
obligations. To the extent that
these actual payments were in fact
made during the taxable years in
issue, the taxpayers are deemed
to have both received dividend
income and made an interest
payment. Id. at 1179-1190.

Thus, in the first case of its kind, the
Tax Court held that where a corporation deliberately borrowed money in
order to make interest-free loans to
its shareholders, the corporation was
nothing more than the agent of the
shareholders. The shareholders were
receiving taxable income in the amount
of the economic benefit bestowed by
the corporation; that is, the shareholders were receiving a dividend.
However, at the same time, the Court
did permit the taxpayers to deduct
under section 163 of the Code the
interest payments attributed to them
disregarding the Commissioner's argument that interest had not been "paid"
as required by the Code.
In Marsh v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 317

(1979), the Tax Court once again
refused to overrule the Dean case in

context of a commercial transaction
and held that an interest-free loan
under such circumstances is without
income tax effect. In William G. Martin, 39 T.C.M. 531 (1979), appeal docketed, (5th Cir. 1981), arguments of the
government were uniformly rejected
in the context of an interest-free loan
between a corporation and a nonshareholder.
In two additional recent Tax Court
rulings involving interest-free loans,
Est. of Benjamin Liechtung, 40 T.C.M.
1118 (1980) and Jack Baker, 75 T.C.
166 (1980), the Commissioner requested that Dean be overruled or distinguished. In each case, after once
again refusing to reconsider Dean, the
Court found the Commissioner's
argument that the proceeds of the
loans were used to invest in taxexempt securities was not properly
before the Court. Thus, in both Liechtung and Baker, the Court refused to
address the merits of the Commissioner's argument.
The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, in Suttle v.
Commissioner, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir.
1980), affirmed the decision of the
Tax Court and applied the rationale
of Dean to the facts before it. In Suttle,
the taxpayer was the majority shareholder in a closely held corporation
which had, for many years, made
open account interest-free loans to
the taxpayer. Arguing that Dean should
be overruled, the Commissioner
pressed his economic benefit theory
as justification for this position. Rejecting this request, the Court declared:
As in Dean, the Commissioner
draws analogy between Suttle's
interest free loans and the free
usage of other corporate property. Since Suttle neither paid nor
incurred a legal obligation to pay
interest, the Commissioner
argues that no basis for the
offsetting 'washout' deduction
exists. We find the Dean rationale
to be persuasive as applied to the
facts of this case. Id. at 1128.
Based upon the absolute rejection
by the Tax Court of the Internal
Revenue Service's continuing obses-

sion that the Dean case be overruled,
as well as upon the Fourth and Fifth
Circuit's affirmation of the basic principle of Dean, interest-free loans may
be regarded as relatively safe until
such time that Congress enacts legislation to limit or overrule the Dean
result. However, certain basic safeguards should be observed in connection with any interest-free loan. First,
it is absolutely imperative that these
loans be made only on demand, and
not a term basis; otherwise, potential
gift tax problems may arise. See: Crown
v. Commissioner, supra; see also: Jimmy J.

Huffman, 41 T.C.M. 619 (1980). Second,
these loans should at all times be evidenced by promissory notes. Actual
repayments should, in fact, be made
at irregular intervals. The use of a
formal written note and the making
of actual repayments will prevent the
Service from establishing that the
loans were, in reality, either a taxable
dividend to the shareholder or a taxable gift to the purported borrower.
Third, the lender should not be placed
in a position of an intermediary or
agent by borrowing money and lending it to the ultimate borrower. Within
the framework of the Creel decision,
under such circumstances a court
may impute income to the borrower.
Finally, the borrower should not invest
the proceeds of the loan in tax-exempt
securities. Although the law is unsettled as to whether Dean would be
applied under such circumstances, the
Tax Court, in several of the cases discussed above, has clearly intimated
that Dean may be inapplicable. Again,
until this question has been definitively answered, a substantial risk
would be undertaken by investing the
proceeds of an interest-free loan in
tax-exempt securities.
Until such time as Congress acts to
change the tax-free status of nointerest loans, properly structured,
they continue to achieve tax savings.
Footnotes
1 Clifford Trusts are regulated by I.R.C. §671-

77 loosely called the Clifford Rules because
they supplanted Helvering V. Clifford, 309

U.S. 331 (1940). The trust device is useful
from the standpoint of a donor of property
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who wishes to retain elements of control
over the disposition of her gift. However,
failure to closely follow statutory regulations can make the trust income attributable
to the donor rather than the donee.
MERTENS, The Law of Federal Income Taxation
(Malone ed. (974)
Id.
The Courts considering the question of the
status of no-interest loans have essentially
limited their discussion to the tax effect
upon the borrower. Thus, this article will
only discuss the taxability of the borrower.
For an analysis of the potential tax consequences to the lender, See Generally, R.I.
Keller, The Tax Consequences of InterestFree Loans from Corporations to Shareholders and from Employers to Employees,
19 BOSTON COL. L. REV. 231 (1978).
This analysis of the Court is flawed for several additional reasons. First, for those deductions based upon gross income, there
would be miscalculations. Second, where a
corporation does not have sufficient earnings and profits to give rise to a taxable dividend, although a nontaxable return of capital would be given to a shareholder, the
shareholder should be entitled to an offsetting interest deduction. Third, interest is not
always deductible by a shareholder if he does
not itemize his deductions. In addition, under
section 163(d) of the Code, there are certain
limitations on interest deductions. See generally: R.I. Keller, The Tax Consequences of
Interest-Free Loans from Corporations to
Shareholders and from Employers to
Employees, supra at 235-340.
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The Pyramid Scheme:
Don't Be The Mortar Between The Bricks
by Clinton R. Black IV
While the practicing business lawyer faces a variety of possible issues
and problems when dealing with
clients, one area which calls for particularly close scrutiny is securities
regulation. Several types of business
problems raise obvious securities implications. It should be noted, however, that unconventional investment
vehicles which do not appear to have
securities implications can be a trap
for the unwary and lead to liability for
both client and lawyer if not recognized early and addressed properly.
These unconventional investment vehicles usually fall within the definition of "security" under the concept
of investment contract.
Once defined as a security, the plan
must either be registered with federal
and state agencies or find an exemption from registration under federal
and state laws and regulations. A
graphic example of an unconventional
investment opportunity which falls
within the definition of an investment contract, and is therefore a
security, is the pyramid scheme or
chain letter concept.
The evolution of the investment
contract theory as applied to unconventional investments has been stated
no more eloquently than in those
recent cases dealing specifically with
pyramid promotional schemes.
A pyramid scheme operating in
Maryland during the summer of 1980,
the so-called $16,000 pyramid, employed the classic pyramid structure.
In the basic $16,000 scheme, a chart is
drawn consisting, generally, of five
levels of boxes. A single large box is
on top, two slightly smaller boxes are
on the next level, four boxes are
below that, eight boxes fall on the
following plane, and sixteen boxes lie
across the bottom. There is one additional spot, called the zero position,
which rests above the top box.
Players "buy in" to the chart with
$1,000. A new investor, entering the

pyramid at the bottom, gives $500 to
the person in the slot directly above
and another $500 to the lucky player
in the zero position. Players progress
to the zero position and the $16,000
prize as the bottom level fills up.
In order to recoup more than one's
initial $1,000 investment many new
players must be brought in. They fill a
sixth level of 32 slots. Once these are

filled, the pyramid splits into four
new charts, each starting out with
one-fourth the needed investors.
When these big splits occur, investors move up rapidly in the new
pyramids. Once in the zero position,
only 32 new prospects are needed to
earn a player his $16,000 reward.
Totaling it all up, at least 128 new
players are needed to give each starting player the $16,000 jackpot.

Further, the simple mathematical
factors inherent in the scheme show
the fallacy upon which the $16,000
pyramid is based. In a six level pyramid
such as the $16,000 scheme, 128 new

people must join after any given person for that person to reach the top
and collect the profit. For each of
those 128 new people to profit, 16,384
new persons are needed. For each of
those 16,384 people to profit over
2,097,000 new people are needed.

This is equal to approximately onehalf the population of Maryland.
Thus, using the classic illustration,
if a number of people put the same
amount of money into a box, each
time any person withdraws more
from the box than he put in, some
other person will lose the same amount
the other person gained. See: O'Toole
vs. State, Case No. CJ-80-1984 (Okla.
Co. Dist. Ct. 1980).
Based upon federal and state case
law, as well as releases stating the
official position of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Maryland
authorities concluded that the $16,000
pyramid constituted an investment
contract. Therefore it was a security

